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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

included the assets attributable to Kimbrell's, the district court correctly
keyed damages to the parent's assets.
The Fourth Circuit expressed undue concern over the financial strain
which those found liable may incur in multiple suits for Truth in Lending
violations. A major concern supporting the court's decision was the potential $1.5 million recovery which could have resulted if consumers in each
of Furniture Distributors' subsidiaries brought suit and claimed damages
calculated on the parent's net worth. 53 Ultimately, Barberwill allow large
corporations to escape substantial liability for Truth in Lending violations
by limiting awards to one percent of the net worth allocable to a subsidiary.
Further, the Fourth Circuit's decision encourages the establishment of
subsidiaries as a means of avoiding substantial damages.
The "creditor's" net worth issue is a technical one and is important
primarily to large enterprises operating through subsidiaries. Although
commentators predicted much litigation over the issue at the time of the
Act's amendment, 4 the question has received little attention. This result
is attributable to the fact that a class action is rarely a superior means of
adjudicating Truth in Lending controversies, and few classes receive certification.5 Nevertheless, the Barberdecision indicates the Fourth Circuit's
reluctance to impose large penalties for violations of statutes such as the
Truth in Lending Act.
BErsY M. CALIcOrT

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Federalism in De Facto Taking Analysis
In Donohoe Construction Company v. Montgomery County' the Fourth
Circuit denied compensation under the fifth amendment for state-imposed
burdens2 on a developer's property interests. 3 The Fourth Circuit predicated its decision in part on recently emerging principles of federalism, 4
13 See 577 F.2d at 224. The one-year statute of limitations imposed by the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(e) (1976), would likelyprevent exorbitant multiple recoveries since no other suits had
yet been filed against the defendants with regard to the violations alleged in the instant case.
The Barber court dismissed this point in a footnote, reasoning that ". . . it is the potential
overall recovery which concerns us, not the likelihood that it will be realized." Id. at 224 n.21.
" See Evans, supra note 48, at 13.
5 See Weathersby v. Fireside Thrift Co., 5 CONS. CRED. GumE (CCH) 98,640 at 88,181

(N.D. Cal. 1975) (noting Congress' failure to provide mechanism enabling courts to handle
Truth in Lending class actions).
1 567 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3123 (1978).
2 Id. at 609. Donohoe dealt with both state and county action. See note 8 infra. Since
the power of local government in land planning exists only as delegated by the state, no
distinction will be made between municipal, county and state action as an exercise of state
power. See Thomson v. Lee County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 327, 330 (1865) (political subdivisions
of a state exercise only powers delegated by the state).
567 F.2d at 609.
Id., n.17; see note 41 infra.
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reaffirming state discretion in land use planning.' The Donohoe decision
may signal the Fourth Circuit's increasing reluctance to subject local land
management policy to federal review under the compensation clause of the
fifth amendment.'
The Donohoe litigation arose after a series of land use restrictions frustrated Donohoe Construction Company's (Donohoe) attempt to build an
office tower on property in Montgomery County, Maryland.7 Donohoe
bought the tract in March 1973, in spite of a pending county zoning proposal designed to curtail commercial development of the tract. 8 Shortly
after the purchase Donohoe applied for a building permit, submitting a
subdivision plan with its application.9 Montgomery County denied Donohoe's subdivision plan in August 1973 for lack of adequate sewer service. 0
In April 1974 the county rejected Donohoe's building permit application."
In May 1974 Montgomery County set aside funds to acquire Donohoe's
land for a park sometime in 1975, and in July 1974 the county rezoned the
area to prevent construction of commercial office buildings.'2 At this point,
Donohoe filed suit in federal court alleging that Montgomery County had
deprived the use of its property without just compensation in violation of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' 3
567 F.2d at 609.
See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
567 F.2d at 605.
Id. The Montgomery County Council was the principal defendant in Donohoe although
the case actually concerned cooperative action by four state and county agencies. A master
plan drafted by the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (Park Commission) governed the land in controversy. Id. n.1. The Montgomery County portion of the
plan is overseen by the Montgomery County Planning Board (Planning Board), comprised
of those members of the Park Commission appointed by the Montgomery County Council.
Id. n.2. The Montgomery County Council in turn has final authority over land use in Montgomery County. Id. at 606. The fourth agency involved was the Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission (Sanitary Commission), charged with managing public sewage facilities in
Montgomery County. Id. at 605 n.3.
I Donohoe intended to raze two existing houses and to combine the lots for its office
building. Id. at 605. If a tract is enlarged or subdivided a subdivision plan must be submitted
to keep county plat records current. Id. at 606 n.4. The subdivision plan must be cleared
before a building permit can issue. Id. at 606. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B § 5.01 (1957);
MONGOMERY COUNTY CODE § 50-20 (1972).
10567 F.2d at 606. A moratorium on new sewer hook-ups was in effect in Montgomery
County. Id. n.6. A federal district court had previously upheld the moratorium as a constitutional exercise of state power to protect the public health. See Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington
Suburban Sanitary Comm., 400 F. Supp. 1369, 1383 (D. Md. 1975).
1, 567 F.2d at 606.
12Id.
'1 The fifth amendment forbids that "private property be taken for public use without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment constrained at first only
the federal government and not the states. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876); Barron
v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 465, 466 (1833). However, the Supreme Court applied the spirit
and then the letter of the fifth amendment in cases of state expropriations by incorporating
its principle in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (fifth amendment's prohibition of expropriation without
compensation incorporated in the meaning of due process) (dictum); Smyth v. Ames, 169
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The lower court concluded that Montgomery County's actions exceeded
permissable regulation and amounted to an expropriation of Donohoe's
property, by "preventing any reasonable economic use of [Donohoe's]
land."" The Fourth Circuit reversed, directing entry of judgment for
Montgomery County.'5 Although the Fourth Circuit attributed the disparity between its result and that of the lower court to a differing interpretation of the facts, the Fourth Circuit's desire to promote local land planning
underlay its decision, while the lower court addressed primarily the effect
of the land regulation on Donohoe's interests. 6
Before addressing the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit disposed
of two jurisdictional issues.' The Fourth Circuit first held that Donohoe's
complaint raised a federal question cognizable in federal court.'8 The
Fourth Circuit then determined that the controversy involved no potentially dispositive issues of state law, making abstention inappropriate."
Having asserted its jurisdiction the Fourth Circuit turned to the question
U.S. 466, 522 (1897) (due process clause prohibits state taking property without compensation); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1896) (fifth amendment prohibition of expropriation a "principle of universal law" reflected in due process
clause). U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1. See also Slavitt, Just CompensationUpdated, 48 CoNN.
B.J. 241, 242 (1973). Unlike the fifth amendment, the fourteenth amendment is expressly
binding on the states. Ex ParteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879); U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV
§ 1.
" 567 F.2d at 606. The lower court opinion is unreported. The Fourth Circuit cited
pertinent portions. Id. at 606 n.10; 607, 608 n.15. The lower court entered judgment for
$461,042.14, assessing the market value of Donohoe's land at $378,888, plus $82,154.14 in
expenses for holding the property during the litigation. Id. at 605, 606 n.10.
'5

Id. at 605.

"Id. The Fourth Circuit viewed the facts as insufficient to support a finding of de facto
taking. Id.
' 567 F.2d at 607.
" Id. Federal courts have jurisdiction only over claims that Congress has conferred authority on them to hear. U.S. CoNsT. art. Ell § 1, 2; Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
214, 226 (1874) (Congress gives federal courts authority it deems fit to confer). Congress
granted federal courts the authority to resolve controversies raising a federal question, such
as issues arising under the Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976); Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S.
528, 542 (1974) (federal jurisdiction exists in cases presenting a federal question); Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1962). The Fourth Circuit defined the federal question in Donohoe
as the limitations placed on state condemnation and zoning powers by the fourteenth amendment. 567 F.2d at 607. Montgomery County argued that since the County had not yet acquired Donohoe's land no taking occurred, no violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments resulted, and hence the case presented no federal question. Id. The Fourth Circuit
noted a taking may encompass more than physical deprivation, see text accompanying notes
21-26 infra, and that where a complaint raises allegations that may or may not state a federal
claim, a federal court should take jurisdiction to decide the merits of the controversy. 567
F.2d at 607.
", 567 F.2d at 607. Federal courts may abstain from exercising their jurisdiction if there
exists a potentially dispositive issue of state law, thus making a constitutional decision
unnecessary. Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941); see Alabama
Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951) (abstention in recognition of
state court's greater familiarity with local situation); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,
327 (1943) (abstention to allow state resolution of conflicts in state policy and interpret state
law).
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of whether Donohoe suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of property
without just compensation."
In fulfilling its function of promoting the public welfare, a state may
exercise the power of eminent domain. 21 The fifth amendment obligates a
state to compensate landowners for expropriated property.22 The state also
may serve public interests by land use regulation,n which often diminishes
the value of property, but is uncompensable under the fifth amendment.Y
A difficulty arises when the landowner complains of regulatory burdens
that virtually deprive him of his entire interest in the land. Depending on
the purpose and effect of the burden and the extent of the state's gain and
the landowner's loss, courts may find that a de facto taking of the land
occurred and accordingly direct payment of compensation.2 Each case
26
turns on the court's interpretation of the facts.
Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
Montgomery County injured Donohoe's property interests.Y The lower
567 F.2d at 607.
The capacity of the state to take private property through th6 power of eminent
domain is undisputed. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883). Eminent domain is
a form of the state's police power since it serves the common good. Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); see Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH.
L. REv. 553, 559, 560-61 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Stoebuck, Eminent Domain]. See
generally W. STOEBUCK, NONTREPASSORY TAKNGs iN EMwENT DoMAIN, 167-71 (1976)
21

[hereinafter cited as SToFsucm, TAKINGS].

See note 13 supra.
restriction on land use deprives the owner of some interest and is in that sense a
taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
accord, STOEBUCK, TAK NGS, supra note 21, at 170. See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALu L. REv. 36, 62 & 75 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
24 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (zoning to exclude industry held
to be regulatory and uncompensable); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922) (prohibiting coal extraction deprived owner of his property interest but was nonetheless uncompensable); see note 26 infra.
Is Taking without formal condemnation proceedings is called a de facto taking, de facto
condemnation, or inverse condemnation. Baumgardner, Takings Under the Police
Power-The Development of Inverse Condemnation As a Method of Challenging Zoning
Ordinances, 30 Sw.L.J. 723, 724 (1976). These terms are sometimes used interchangeably.
See, e.g., Richmond Elks Hall Assoc. v. Richmond, 561 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1977).
n1567 F.2d at 608 n.13. The line between compensable and uncompensable burdens is
difficult to draw, since the distinction results from conflicting policies. One policy is to
preserve the sanctity of private property. 2 STORY, CONSTrrUION 547-48 (4th ed. 1873). Private
property interests may be in conflict with the modem necessity of controlling land use,
however, and a state cannot pay for every burden the state imposes. Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). This tension between private interest and public need
created a morass of decisions at both state and federal levels. See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County, A Perspective on Thirty Years of Supreme Court ExpropriationLaw, 1962 Sup.
CT. REV. 63, 64 n.2, 65; Payne, A Survey of New Jersey Eminent Domain Law, 30 RuTrOrs
L. Rv. 1111, 1114, (1977). See generally Note, Taking or Demanding by Police Power: the
Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 1, 2 (1971). Efforts to reconcile
de facto taking cases or formulate a test for separating compensable takings from uncompensable regulations have been unsuccessful. Id. See also Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking
Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 156, 166 n.5. (1974).
22

22 Any

27 567 F.2d at 606 n.10; 609.
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court considered Montgomery County's actions as a whole, viewing their
cumulative effect as a de facto taking of Donohoe's property.2 The Fourth
Circuit chose to inquire further into the county's purpose in imposing each
of the various burdens on Donohoe. " The court decided that the lower
court failed to give sufficient weight to a pre-existing moratorium on new
sewer connections in the area." In light of the moratorium, the Fourth
Circuit held that the county's refusal to issue a.building permit, rejection
of Donohoe's subdivision plan and subsequent re-zoning of the property
were ostensibly intended to reduce sewage flow in the area, constituting
an exercise of the state's power to protect the public health which could
31
not be considered compensable.
The Fourth Circuit consequently looked only to the burden imposed by
county preparations for acquiring Donohoe's property to determine
whether the county's actions amounted to de facto taking warranting federal intervention.32 A prolonged threat of condemnation may unfairly diminish the market value of property before eventual government acquisition
and can itself constitute a de facto taking.3 The Fourth Circuit noted,
however, that Donohoe's land lay under the "cloud of condemnation" for
only six months.3 4 Although the threatened condemnation substantially
reduced the value of Donohoe's property, the Fourth Circuit held that six
months was insufficient time to establish "strong and convincing evidence" that Montgomery County had abused its powers. 3 The Court concluded that to intervene so early and declare a de facto taking would
36
disrupt legitimate planning efforts of local governments.
Id. at 607-08.
Id. at 608.
:oId. The Fourth Circuit was unwilling to reconsider the constitutionality of the sewer
moratorium since none of the parties to the present litigation had any control over the
moratorium. Id. at 608 n.14; see note 10 supra.
31 567 F.2d at 609.

2 Id. at 608.
3 See, e.g., Richmond Elks Hall Assoc. v. Richmond, 561 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977)
(delayed acquisition impermissably diminished land value); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F.
Supp. 655, 666 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (city prolonged threat of condemnation to drive down value
of property before acquisition). See generally Kratovil, Zoning, A New Look, 11 CREIGHTON
L. Ray. 433, 437 (1977); see also Sax, supra note 23, at 74; Hulen, Abusive Exercises of the
Power of Eminent Domain-Taking a Look at What the Taker Took, 44 WASH. L. Rav. 200,
221 & 224-26 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hulen].
567 F.2d at 608.
567 F.2d at 609. The Fourth Circuit distinguished three cases Donohoe offered in
support of the lower court's ruling in its favor, concluding that the three cases evinced a
pattern of government abuse in which the "cloud of condemnation" hung over the property
for years, and that such a pattern of abuse was absent in this case. See Benenson v. United
States, 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (federal renovation project deprived owners of use of hotel
for ten years); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (Park
Service in creating national seashore frustrated developer's attempted acquisition of rightof-way and would not purchase disabled developer's land for four years); Foster v. City of
Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (proposed city housing project led to dilapidation
of property and loss of tenants; land subject to condemnation for ten years).
u 567 F.2d at 609 n.17.

484

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

The Donohoe decision did not articulate a specific test to determine
what magnitude or duration of a burden on property would constitute a
de facto taking." The decision did evince the Fourth Circuit's reticence to
entangle itself in land controversies and willingness to encourage local land
planning even if at some expense to the private owner. 8 Between the
extremes of imposing liability for all state infringements of property interests"9 or allowing unbridled discretion to restrict land use,"0 the Fourth
Circuit apparently favors state discretion. The Fourth Circuit noted that
its decision was consistent with a concern for federalism manifest in recent
Supreme Court cases.'
The assertion of federalism in Donohoe may indicate a general inhospitality in the Fourth Circuit to challenges of state discretion in land use
planning.'" Traditionally, landowners have preferred to seek protection for
their property interests in federal instead of state court, believing state3
courts to be more tolerant of burdensome local government regulations.
' Id. at 609. The Fourth Circuit indicated only that Donohoe had not yet suffered a de
facto taking, since in regulating Donohoe's land Montgomery County 'did not egregiously
abuse its powers. Id.
31The District Court held Montgomery County had exceeded the limits of due process.
Id. at 608 n.15. The Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision without explicitly
defining the boundary between compensable and uncompensable burdens. Id. at 609. See
note 37 supra.
" See, e.g., Richmond Elks Hall Assoc. v. Richmond, 561 F.2d 1327, 1332 (9th Cir. 1977).
10The polar extreme of refusing compensation for any regulatory burden has never been
accepted by a court although advocated by some commentators. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D.
CALLEs & J. BmT^,THE T
G ISsUE, 246-253, 325 (1973). See also Berger, The Accomodation Power in Land Use Controversies:A Reply to Professor Costonis,76 COLUM. L. REv. 799,
815 (1976) (conflicting schools of thought on imposing the duty to compensate for diminished
property values).
" 567 F.2d at 609 n. 17. The Fourth Circuit cited National League of Cities v. Usury,
426 U.S. 833 (1976) and San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) as
exemplary of a recent trend in the Supreme Court in favor of protecting state autonomy from
encroachment by the national government. 567 F.2d at 609 n.17. In NationalLeague of Cities,
the Supreme Court struck down congressional legislation specifying minimum wage provisions for state employment, since allowing Congress power to dictate state hiring practices
would "if unchecked ... allow the National Government [to] devour the essentials of state
sovereignty." 426 U.S. at 855, quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). In San Antonio School District, the Supreme Court upheld the Texas system
of financing public education in the face of a fourteenth amendment challenge, even though
the Texas apportionment resulted in better facilities for wealthy school districts than for poor
districts. 411 U.S. at 6. The Court recognized the system needed reform, but held nonetheless
that in the interest of federalism the Texas legislature must be free to distribute funds in
whatever rational manner it chooses. Id. at 58.
42 Donohoe is cited in a recent Maryland district court decision in support of the very
strict requirement that a government must deprive the landowner of all reasonable uses of
his land before a taking occurs. See Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455,
560 (D. Md. 1978). The District Court in Kent Island asserted that it lacked jurisdiction or
in the alternative should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over state land use controversies, supporting the inference that Donohoe represents a general reticence of the Fourth
Circuit to intervene in state land use planning. Id.
0 See Hulen, supra note 33, at 224. There is no evidence to support the belief that federal
courts are more sympathetic to landowners in taking cases than state courts. Id. Federal

